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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Visser’s “A formal account of complex argumentation in a critical discussion” offers 
a valuable first step towards a much-awaited endeavour, namely, the development 
of a computational interpretation of Pragma-dialectics. It is difficult to exaggerate 
the importance of this project: Pragma-dialectics is one of the most powerful 
theories within Argumentation Studies and the possibility of dealing with the model 
of critical discussion in computational terms opens the possibility of important 
developments in computer-based learning tools, in decision support systems and, in 
general, in all those fields in which the meeting between computer science and 
argumentation theory is already being fruitful. As Visser himself points out, it is 
surprising that this project has been hanging for almost three decades! (To be true, 
in principle, such a project will have to wait a bit longer, as it constitutes Visser’s 
ongoing doctoral dissertation. What we have here is only one part of it, and a 
valuable glance of his overall proposal.) 
Visser’s approach is dialogue games, which is not meant to be original: 
actually, the idea of modelling dialogue exchanges as computational games in this 
way goes back to, at least, Prakken’s formal systems for persuasion dialogues 
(2001). But as Visser explains, Pragma-dialectics is particularly valuable to this end 
because of its concern with speech-act theory: in principle, the standards for 
analyzing actual dialogues are closer to their interpretation than in any other 
approach. This is a great advantage in its own, as it enables a more direct 
formalization of actual communicative processes; but, in addition, it may make 
easier the development of communication protocols for artificial agents. Moreover, 
as it is well known, Pragma-dialectics’ concern with the pragmatic intricacies of 
actual argumentative exchanges has been enriched in the last times with a rhetorical 
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perspective that, as Visser envisages, might be integrated within a computational 
model in terms of a game theoretic layer of persuasive strategy. A final gain of this 
project, Visser points out, is to enable an integration of a ‘product’ and ‘process’ 
perspective on computational models of argumentation, because Pragma-dialectics 
integrates a ‘product’ account of argumentation in terms of the argumentation 
structure that underlies an argumentative exchange with a ‘process’ account of 
argumentation in terms of the rules that apply in such exchanges. As Visser 
contends, such integration could bring us closer to realistic computational models of 
human argumentative practice that, at the same time, enable practicable software 
applications. 
All this would show that Visser’s project should have a very positive impact 
within the flourishing field of Argumentation and Computation. In turn, Pragma-
dialectics, and Argumentation Theory in general, could benefit from this project in 
as much as the recursive treatment of any theory might reveal some of its 
weaknesses and needs of improvement. It is this latter question that we would like 
to consider at some length in these comments. 
 
2. VISSER’S FORMAL ACCOUNT OF PRAGMA-DIALECTICS’ ARGUMENTATION STAGE 
 
Visser’s target in this paper is only one stage of the critical discussion, namely, the 
argumentation stage. His strategy is to characterize a dialogue game according to 
the pragma-dialectical rules that apply to the argumentation stage. His goal is to 
show “how sequences of moves in the dialogue game relate to complex 
argumentation structures” (Visser, 2013, p. 1). 
 To this end, he proposes a directed-graph consisting of all those moves that 
the two players of a game are allowed or required to make at this stage if they are to 
count as having a critical discussion, which is what determines the adequacy of their 
exchange. 
 Now, let us focus in Visser’s reconstruction of a single argumentation case, as 
this is the pattern that all complex argumentation structures are supposed to consist 
of. Single argumentation is the case in which the proponent puts forward an 
argument (understood as a simple, first order constative speech-act) in defence of a 
standpoint. Visser points out that, in his graph, this occurs when, during a game, the 
protagonist's move “Arg A, A justifies Stp S” is made exactly once because either the 
antagonist accepted the argument outright, or did so as a result of successfully going 
through intersubjective procedures. Pragma-dialectics considers four types of 
intersubjective procedures -namely, identification, inference, explicitization or 
testing (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004)- but in this part of his project, Visser 
only takes into account identification and testing. 
 At any rate, it should be noted that the development of intersubjective 
procedures is supposed to proceed through further argumentation. For this reason, 
the way in which single argumentation can be seen as constituting the basis that 
recursively gives rise to any other type of complex argumentation structures is just 
(in Visser’s account): 
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1   S 
1.1   A 
1.1'   A justifies S 
 
 But what does it mean to put forward 1.1’ as a premise? What does it mean to 
say that A justifies S? In principle, justification is the output of good argumentation, 
so that the premise that A justifies S amounts to the premise that there is good 
argumentation from A to S. But in that case, are we not saying that single 
argumentation -that is, the basic argumentative unit within a critical discussion- 
makes an inextricable appeal to its own goodness? Moreover, following Pragma-
dialectics’ own standards, this means that, in order to have a winner strategy for a 
single argumentation, such a self-referential premise has to be in the list of shared 
premises. But in that case, why should we engage in a critical discussion for 
justifying S? 
 Notice that this problem does not appear just because of the way Visser has 
reconstructed single argumentation in his model: if, instead of 1.1’, he had 
introduced something like  
 
 (1.1’’) “if A, then S”,  
 
he would still have to show how the new set of shared premises plus standpoint 
could constitute single sound argumentation at all -for example, it might be the case 
that the corresponding inference is defeasible, so that having 1.1 and 1.1’’ as shared 
premises does not constitute a sound defence of S. 
 If this observation is correct, the critical discussion model cannot constitute a 
model of justification, but a model of something else -like, for example, the way to 
dialectically proceed once we have a sub-theory of justification. If we deem 
justification as the output of good argumentation, as we think we should, this means 
that Pragma-dialectics, by itself, is not a normative theory of argumentation. 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
Paradoxically, this attempt to present Pragma-dialectics as a computational 
normative model of argumentation would end up showing that Pragma-dialectics is 
not such a model. Certainly, it might be discussed whether Visser’s use of the 
Argument Interchange Format for the analytic overview is adequate for the 
requirements of Pragma-dialectics, including its account of speech-acts. As Visser 
himself acknowledges:   
 
While the original ideal model of a critical discussion is pragmatic besides 
dialectical, I currently only take an abstracted view of a discussion progressing like a 
game without going into the details of how these discussion moves are manifested 
in terms of illocutionary acts. (Visser, 2013, p. 5) 
 
 But, as we have tried to show, this is not a problem of the way in which Visser 
has modelled the critical discussion procedure, but of the way in which Pragma-
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dialectics makes an inextricable appeal to justification both as part of the critical 
discussion procedure and as the alleged output of playing by the rules. 
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